A survey by the Dutch think-tank Clingendael reveals a dramatic shift in regional alliances, with Armenia emerging as the European Union’s primary partner in the South Caucasus. The study, which polled 41 regional specialists, scored Armenia-EU relations at 8.47 on a scale of 1 to 10. This figure ranks third among 51 bilateral relationships assessed in the report "Realignment and competition: the 2026 geopolitical map of the South Caucasus." In stark contrast, Georgia’s ties with Brussels have collapsed to a score of 2.57, placing them below its relationship with Russia, which stands at 3.71. Only Armenia-Pakistan relations, rated at 2.07, performed worse than the Georgia-EU pairing.
A sharp reversal for Tbilisi
The findings mark a complete inversion from 2023, when Georgia was the bloc’s closest partner in the region. At that time, experts classified Georgia-EU relations as good, while ties between Tbilisi and Moscow were rated bad. Now, the EU "now rallies mostly around Armenia rather than the former favourite Georgia," according to the report. Georgia’s strongest political relationships are now with Turkey (7.64), Azerbaijan (7.63), the United Arab Emirates (7.43), and China (7.00). However, the report questions whether these partners can compensate for the loss of Western political and economic ties. "Tbilisi seems to have lost its close ties with the EU and US without being able to replace them with comparably weighty – economic, political – alternatives," it says. Economic resilience remains, though, with bilateral trade turnover reaching a record $5.6bn in 2025. The intensity of economic interactions with the EU stays at 5.14, matching the level seen with Russia. Pragmatic interests in trade and energy "have not suffered significantly," allowing Brussels to maintain pressure on the Georgian government. The EU has postponed its decision on next steps until January, while the Constitutional Court considers a case seeking to ban five opposition parties. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has described Georgia as a candidate country "only on paper."
Armenia’s pivot and constitutional hurdles
Armenia’s political ties with France score 9.27, second only to Azerbaijan-Turkey relations at 9.31. Its relationship with the United States scores 7.87, while ties with Russia received a rating of 3.80. Relations with Moscow have deteriorated from ambiguous in 2023 to somewhat adversarial, although Armenia remains economically dependent on Russia. Trade data underlines the shift towards Europe, with Armenia’s trade with Russia falling 19.2% year on year to $3.59bn in January-August. Meanwhile, trade with the EU rose 53.9% to $2.43bn. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on November 3 that Armenia could apply to join the EU in 2027 or 2028, despite warnings from Moscow that it must choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. The peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, initialled in Washington in August 2025, remains unsigned. Baku insists that Yerevan remove an indirect reference to Nagorno-Karabakh from the preamble of its constitution. "Once these territorial claims are removed from the constitution, we see no problem in signing the final peace agreement," Azerbaijani presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev said in August. This demand poses a challenge for Pashinyan, whose Civil Contract party holds 64 seats in parliament, short of the 70 needed to send a new constitution to a referendum. Both opposition groups have refused to support a draft they describe as imposed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Pashinyan stated on October 22 he could call early elections if opposition support for constitutional changes could not be secured. A draft constitution is expected by the end of the year. Preparations for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) are proceeding, with Armenia’s parliament ratifying the framework agreement on October 28. This gives the United States a 74% stake in the development company and Armenia the remaining 26%. Construction is expected to slip to 2027. The route could become more important if instability in Iran increases, offering an alternative transit connection that bypasses Iranian territory. Clingendael credits Washington with securing the breakthrough in the peace process, noting that the United States has working relations with both sides and greater influence than Brussels. The EU scores higher than the United States in Armenia, but lower in Azerbaijan, where Washington receives 6.77 against the EU’s 5.62. The United States had been "outplaying both Russia and the EU," the report says, adding that its mediation "may still be needed to get to the signing of the peace deal." It advises Brussels to concentrate on implementing agreements through border delimitation, customs cooperation, monitoring and infrastructure rather than competing with Washington for diplomatic leadership. The EU has pledged up to €200mn for regional connectivity.
